Knowledge check

RSA padding: OAEP, PKCS#1 v1.5, and why raw RSA fails

10 questions testing what you just read — no login, no tracking, just immediate feedback.

Question 1 of 10

What made Bleichenbacher's 1998 attack against PKCS#1 v1.5 possible?

Question 2 of 10

What replaced PKCS#1 v1.5 padding as the modern standard for RSA encryption?

Question 3 of 10

Why is "textbook RSA" (the raw formula, no padding) insecure?

Question 4 of 10

Besides being deterministic, what other fatal property does raw "textbook RSA" have?

Question 5 of 10

What does the "0x02" byte signify in PKCS#1 v1.5 padding, before the random padding string?

Question 6 of 10

What 2017 attack showed variants of Bleichenbacher's padding-oracle attack were still being found against production TLS servers, nearly two decades later?

Question 7 of 10

Roughly how many queries against modified ciphertexts does Bleichenbacher's attack typically require?

Question 8 of 10

What is RSA-PSS?

Question 9 of 10

How does OAEP build its randomization?

Question 10 of 10

What does the module say about implementing RSA padding yourself?

0 / 10 answered